Abstract: In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and we examine the architectures of strict Nash networks. We show that centrality and small diameter are robust features of strict Nash networks. Then, we study the Nash and efficient networks when the decay vanishes.
Introduction
Social networks play a vital role in the diffusion of information across society in setting as diverse as referral networks for jobs (Granovetter, 1974 ) and assessing quality of products ranging from cars to computers (Rogers an Kincaid, 1981) . The role played by networks has led researchers to develop theories of network formation. Several models have been proposed which address different types of network situations.
Our paper deals with the two-way flow connections model introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000a) . In this model a player i can access a player j directly by forming a costly link with j. Moreover, through her link with j, player i accesses other players that player j is accessing on her own. Finally the link formed by player i creates a similar flow of information to player j, and hence the name two-way flow model. A phone call is a typical example given to illustrate this type of situation.
In the basic two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000a) , the transmission of information between two players is independent of the distance between these players in the network, that is there is no decay. Moreover, players are homogeneous, that is each player i benefits identically from accessing other players and all the costs associated with the setting of links do not depend on the identity of the initiator and the receiver of the link. In this context, Bala and Goyal (2000a) find that the set of equilibrium networks is very small, i.e., only the empty network and the inward-pointing star (a star network where the player at the center forms all the links) can be strict Nash networks. Now in many situations they are delays as well as lowering of quality, when information is transmitted through a series of agents, making decay a significant factor. Moreover individuals are often heterogeneous. For instance some of them may be more interesting in a particular issue and therefore better informed which makes them more valuable as contacts.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the introduction of both decay and players heterogeneity on the architectures of networks that will be formed in equilibrium. We ask what are the predictable patterns of networks that will emerge when players have the opportunity to set links between each other, in presence of decay in the flow of resources and players heterogeneity. 1 Our paper revisits the insider-outsider model introduced by GGK (2006) and refines some of their results. The authors introduce heterogeneity of players in the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000a) . More precisely, they assume that players belong to different groups and costs of forming links within groups is lower than costs of forming inter-groups links. The model is called the insider-outsider model in their paper. GGK (2006) first consider the transmission of value to be independent of the length of the paths between players, that is there is no decay. Then they introduce a small amount of decay into their framework to test the robustness of their findings. 2 They show that for very small amount of decay and for intermediate costs of intra-groups and inter-groups links 3 , the empty network and the interlinked periphery-sponsored stars network are the only strict Nash networks. Note that a interlinked periphery-sponsored stars network satisfies two conditions. First, in each group there exists a player, called the center player, such that all other players of the group, called the periphery players, form a link with the center player. Second, there exists a player belonging to one group who forms a link with the center player of the other group. In the paper we elaborate on the insider-outsider model introduced by GGK (2006) concerning decay in two directions. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous links in strict Nash networks and we examine the architectures of strict Nash networks. We show that in this situation the set of non-empty strict Nash networks is larger than in GGK (2006). It includes three other types of architectures in addition to interlinked periphery-sponsored stars networks. It is interesting to note that all these architectures share similar structural properties, namely small diameter and high asymmetries in centrality of players, since these properties are also features of equilibrium networks in the homogeneous model of Bala and Goyal (2000a) and the insider-outsider 1 It is worth noting that decay is just one way of modelling deficiencies in information transmission. Another way is to introduce imperfect reliability of links (see Bala and Goyal, 2000b , for a paper dealing with this). 2 Note that Bala and Goyal (2000a) also introduce decay in their basic model. However the authors still assume that players are homogeneous. 3 In what follows intermediate costs of intra-groups and inter-groups links has the following interpretation: costs of intra-groups links are such that no player i can have any incentive to form a link with a player j when this link allows i to access only to resources of j; costs of inter-groups links are not so high that this always prevents players to form inter-groups links.
model without decay of GGK (2006) . Second, we refine the result of GGK (2006) by assuming that the decay is sufficiently close to 1. More precisely, the class of interlinked periphery-sponsored stars networks, that the authors show as the unique non-empty strict Nash network contains two types of architectures. In the first one, the inter-groups link is sponsored by the center of a star, while in the second one this link is sponsored by a periphery player. We show that if the amount of decay is very low, then the second type of architecture cannot be strict Nash networks. So only the first type of architecture can be non-empty strict Nash networks. This result is important since it shows that strict Nash networks are also efficient networks when the amount of decay is low enough. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the framework of our model. Section 3 addresses the results that we obtain and Section 4 concludes.
Model Setup
We consider a society in which individuals are divided into pre-specified groups and costs of forming links within the groups are lower as compared to costs of forming inter-groups links. To simplify, we assume that there are only 2 groups. Let
. . ,n t } be the set of players belonging to group t, t ∈ {0, 1}. The set of players is N = N 0 ∪ N 1 . As in GGK (2006), we assume that
In the following we will assume that players who belong to the same group are similar and players who belong to different groups are different. In this paper the fact that two players are similar will allow them to have relationships which are less costly than the relationships between two players who are different. Indeed, if two players are similar they can communicate quickly (they speak the same language), while if two players are different (they speak different languages) the communication takes time and is most costly. Each player i ∈ N is assumed to possess some information of value to other players. She can augment her information by communicating with other people. This communication is made possible via pair-wise links. A strategy of player i t ∈ N t , t ∈ {0, 1}, is a vector
, where g i,j ∈ {0, 1} for each player j ∈ N . We say that player i has formed a link with player j in g iff g i,j = 1. We assume throughout the paper that the link g i,j = 1 allows both players i and j to access each other's information. The set of strategies of player i is denoted by 
is a PSS, and j p (g(N t )) forms a link with i c (g(N 1−t )). A distance 3 interlinked periphery-sponsored stars network (D3PSS) is a network such that g(N 1−t ) is a PSS, and there are two players in N t , say i 
PSS CIPSS NCIPSS IMS D3PSS
To complete the definition of a normal-form game of network formation, we specify the payoffs. Let c L (c H ) be the costs incurred by a player i ∈ N t , t ∈ {0, 1}, when she forms a link with a player j ∈ N t (j ∈ N 1−t ). We assume that c H > c L > 0. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the value of the decay parameter. Define N i (g) = {j ∈ N \ {i} | there is a chain between i and j in g} as the set of players who are observed by player i in the network g. The payoff obtained by player i t ∈ N t , t ∈ {0, 1}, in a network g is given by:
Note that this payoff function is identical to the one in GGK (2006) in their insider-outsider model with decay. In this payoff function we take into account the three following assumptions: (i) the value that player i obtains from player j does not depend on the group of j, (ii) the value that player i obtains from player j depends on the distance between i and j, and (iii) the cost that player i incurs for a link with player j depends on whether i and j belong to the same group or not. The strategy g i is said to be a best response of player i to the network g −i if:
The set of all of player i's best responses to g −i is denoted by
We define a strict best response and a strict Nash network by replacing '≥' with '>'. The set of non-empty strict Nash networks is denoted by SN N . A network g is said to be an efficient network if it maximizes the total payoffs of players, that is
Results
Let δ(n) be the value of the decay parameter such that a non-empty strict Nash network is minimal. 6 We are interested by the second point of Proposition 4.3 of GGK (pg.365, 2006) where the authors choose c L such that c L > 1 > δ. We will show that if c L > 1, then it is possible to obtain a more precise characterization of strict Nash networks than the one proposed by GGK. It is worth noting that if c L > δ, then each end player sponsors her link in a strict Nash network. We now present a technical remark which is useful in several proofs.
, then i t 1 obtains a payoff greater or equal to the payoff she obtains in g. The proposition that follows shows that a non-empty strict Nash network is minimally connected.
We first present a lemma that is used in the proposition. The proof of this lemma is put in Appendix.
If there is a chain between i and i ′ which goes through players
A non-empty strict Nash network is minimally connected. 6 Note that for all costs of linking, there always exists a δ(n) high enough such that if δ > δ(n), then no player can have an incentive to form a link with a player she already indirectly accesses in the network.
be the set of players in N t who form no links with any player, and let
be the set of players in N t who received a link from a player in N 1−t . Suppose δ > δ(n) and g ∈ SN N . It follows that g is minimal.
We now show that if c H < δ + (n − 1)δ 2 , then g is connected.
First we show that if player i t ∈ N t has formed a link, then all players in N t must observe her. To introduce a contradiction, assume that there exist in g two players, i t , j t ∈ N t , t ∈ {0, 1}, and a player
we have by linearity of the payoff function: 
We now use this result to show that g is connected. We consider two cases. Third, we show that
by forming a link with the center of the PSS formed by the group N t . It follows that N N t (g) ̸ = ∅, which contradicts the assumption N N t (g) = ∅.
We assume wlog that there are players i t ∈ N t and
Since a player in N t has formed a link, N t is connected. We now show that g is connected. To introduce a contradiction suppose g is not connected. In that case there exists a player k The previous proposition means that in a non-empty strict Nash network, each player i obtains some resources of all other players. Obviously, each player i does not obtain all the resources of other players because of the decay.
The proposition that follows deals with the diameter of non-empty strict Nash networks. We first present a lemma that is used in the proposition. This lemma shows that if there are several links between players of different groups in a strict Nash network, then there is a group, say N t , such thatn − 1 players in N t are not directly linked with players who belong to N 1−t .
Lemma 2 Let δ > δ(n) and c H
The proof of the lemma is put in Appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose δ ∈ (δ(n), 1) and c H < δ + (n − 1)δ 2 . Let g ∈ SN N .
If g contains one inter-groups link:
and D(g(N 1−t )) = 2, for t ∈ {0, 1}.
If g contains several inter-groups links between the two groups, then D(g(N )) = 2.
Proof Suppose δ ∈ (δ(n), 1) and c H < δ + (n − 1)δ 2 . We know from Proposition 1 that a non-empty strict Nash network is minimally connected. We prove successively the two parts of the proposition.
1. Let g ∈ SN N , with only one inter-groups link. We assume that this link is formed by i
To introduce a contradiction, we assume that there are
There are two cases. 
To introduce a contradiction, we suppose that B ̸ = N 1−t . Since g is connected there are players 
Therefore g is not a strict Nash network. The result follows. To conclude, sinceḡ i t
It follows from the previous proposition that the maximal diameter of strict Nash networks is equal to five. It is worth noting that small diameter also characterizes non-empty strict Nash networks in the model with no decay of GGK (2006). The proposition that follows gives an exact characterization of strict Nash networks. We first present two lemmas that are used in the proposition. The proofs of these lemmas are put in Appendix.
Lemma 3 Suppose δ > δ(n) and c H
< δ + (n − 1)δ 2 .
Suppose g is a non-empty strict Nash network
and there is only one inter-groups link. Concerning the second part of the proposition, GGK (2006, Proposition 4.3 part (2a), pg.365) showed that for δ sufficiently close to 1, only interlinked periphery-sponsored stars networks can be candidates as strict Nash networks. It is easy to check that in a CIPSS, g, no player has an incentive to change her strategy when δ is sufficiently close to 1. Therefore, g ∈ SN N . We now show that if δ is sufficiently close to 1, then a NCIPSS cannot be strict Nash. Indeed, suppose a NCIPSS, g, in which players i 
If there is
t ∈ {0, 1} such that D(g(N t )) = 3, then g is a D3PSS.
If for each t ∈ {0, 1} we have D(g(N t )) = 2, then g is a CIPSS, a NCIPSS or a IMS .

Lemma 4 Suppose δ > δ(n) and c H
Consequently, for any δ ∈ (n −4
, and g ̸ ∈ SN N . The result follows.
It follows from the previous proposition that in all non-empty strict Nash architectures few players play a key role in the flow of resources. More precisely, we can distinguish two types of players, end players and non-end players. If one player of the first type is deleted, then only her own resources will not be accessed by other players. This is very different for the second type of players. As an illustration suppose a population with 100 players, that contains two groups, denoted by N 0 , N 1 , of 50 players each.
We know from Proposition 3 that there are only at most 4 players who are not end players in a non-empty strict Nash network. Suppose we delete one of these players, say i ∈ N t , t ∈ {0, 1}. Then this will prevent players of group N 1−t the access to resources of at least 47 players of the group N t . In that sense, non end players have a significant role in the flow of resources in the network, by contrast with end players. It is worth noting that asymmetries in players centrality also characterizes non-empty strict Nash networks in the model with no decay of GGK (2006). We now give an example of parameter values such that all networks g ∈ A are strict Nash networks.
Example 1 Suppose n = 120, δ = 0.94, c L = 40, c H = 45. It can be checked that non minimal networks cannot be strict Nash. Moreover, it can be checked that all networks g ∈ A are strict Nash networks.
We now show that for the same range of costs as in Proposition 3, if the decay parameter is sufficiently close to 1, then CIPSS are efficient networks. 
. Second, we show that CIPSS are efficient networks. We know that an efficient network is minimally connected and contains one link between the two groups. Let E be the set of minimally connected networks which contain one link between the two groups. E is the set of networks candidate to be efficient. All the networks in E contain the same number of links. Consequently, we do not need to take into account total cost of setting links in networks g ′ ∈ E, but only the gross total
Only the distance between the players plays a role in this function. Let 
It is easy to see that the loss of the total value obtained by i t * is the same as the additional value obtained by i 0 , while the total value obtained by each player i ∈ N \ {i 0 , i t * } increases. Therefore our result shows that if δ is high enough, then non-empty strict Nash networks are also efficient networks.
Conclusion
Heterogeneity of players and imperfect transitivity of information flows are central features of economic and social networks. In this note we re-examine the insider-outsider model of GGK (2006) which takes these features into account, by allowing for different degrees of decay in information flows. We refine the results of GGK (2006) paper for the case decay is low and costs of intra-group and inter-group links are intermediate. We find new strict Nash architectures for higher values of decay. It is interesting to note that all these architectures have small diameter and high asymmetries with regard to centrality of players, since these properties are also features of equilibrium networks in the GGK (2006) insider-outsider model with no decay. We also refine the results of GGK (2006) insider-outsider model when δ is sufficiently close to 1. We show for this case that only one type of interlinked periphery-sponsored stars networks can be strict Nash networks. It follows from this result that equilibrium networks are also efficient networks when δ is sufficiently close to 1.
In this note, we restrict our study to situations in which there are only two groups of players. Future research may consider introducing a higher number of groups in the model to examine the robustness of our finding concerning centrality and diameters of strict Nash networks as well as the compatibility between strict Nash and efficient networks. the gross payoff that player j obtains in a network g. Let g be a strict Nash network. Since δ > δ(n), it follows that g is minimal. We suppose that g i 1 ,j 1 = g i 2 ,j 2 = 1 and there is a chain between i 1 and i 2 which goes through players j 1 and j 2 . Let g ′ = g − g i 1 ,j 1 − g i 2 ,j 2 and g ′′ = g − g i 2 ,j 2 + g i 2 ,j 1 .
We have
since player i 1 is closer to player j 1 than player j 2 in g ′ .
We set ℓ ̸ ∈ N j 1 (g ′ ) ∪ N j 2 (g ′ ). We assume that π ℓ (g ′ + g ℓ,j 1 ) ≥ π ℓ (g ′ + g ℓ,j 2 ) and we focus on player i 2 (if this assumption is not true, then we use the same kind of arguments but we focus on player i 1 ). We now show that i 1 , j 1 ∈ N t and i 2 , j 2 ∈ N 1−t , t ∈ {0, 1}, otherwise g ̸ ∈ SN N . We have two cases.
1) Suppose j 1 and j 2 belong to the same group N t , t ∈ {0, 1}. Then the cost that player i 2 incurs when she forms a link with j 1 is equal to the cost that i 2 incurs when she forms a link with j 2 . Moreover, we have
and
We have π i 2 (g ′′ ) ≥ π i 2 (g). It follows that player i 2 does not play a strict best response and g ̸ ∈ SN N . Therefore, j 1 and j 2 do not belong to the same group N t .
2) Suppose j 1 and j 2 do not belong to the same group. We must show that i 1 belongs to the same group as j 1 and i 2 belongs to the same group as j 2 . Let j 1 ∈ N t and j 2 ∈ N 1−t .
First, we show that i 1 and i 2 do not belong to the same group, say N t . To introduce a contradiction, suppose i 1 , i 2 ∈ N t , we have:
since player i 1 plays a best response in g. Likewise we have
Since player i 2 plays a strict best response in g. By summing the two previous inequalities we obtain:
which is not true since i 2 is closer to j 2 than i 1 , and i 1 is closer to j 1 than i 2 , a contradiction. Second by using the same kind of arguments, we show that it is not possible to have i 1 ∈ N 1−t and i 2 ∈ N t . The result follows. Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose g ∈ SN N . First, since δ > δ(n) and c H < δ + (n − 1)δ 2 , we know by
